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OLD-GROWTH FORESTS ON STATE SCHOOL
LANDS-DEDICATED TO OBLIVION?-
PRIVATE TRUST THEORY AND THE
PUBLIC TRUST
Abstract: The application of private trust principles to management of state forest lands
granted to Washington by Congress in the Enabling Act conflicts with the public trust
established in the state constitution and hampers efforts to preserve ecological values on
these lands. This Comment explores alternative common law doctrines which courts
employ to construe restrictive land grants. Principles applying to dedications of land for
public use better suit the task of harmonizing the language of the Enabling Act and the
state constitution to allow for protection of ecological values on state forest lands.
In recent years, scientists and the general public have recognized the
value of the Pacific Northwest's old-growth forests. At the same time,
timber companies are logging these forests at an increasing rate. So
far, this conflict has centered on federal lands where the bulk of uncut
forests remain. But in Washington, attention has turned to the few
significant tracts of virgin forest still standing on state lands.
Congress granted these timber lands to the state one hundred years
ago in the Washington Enabling Act to support public education.'
Mistaken assumptions about the requirements of the Washington
Enabling Act and the state constitution hamper discussion of substan-
tive issues involved in managing the state's old-growth forests. The
state's position is that the Washington Enabling Act and the state con-
stitution create an express trust on behalf of educational institutions.2
The "trust" requires that the land be managed primarily to generate
income for these "trust beneficiaries." ' Consideration of any other
management objectives, however laudable, is precluded by the
Enabling Act and the constitution.4
The state's position is fundamentally flawed. The Enabling Act and
the constitution do not create an express trust, but merely dedicate
public lands for the purpose of supporting public education. The state
should use principles normally applied to dedications of land for pub-
lic purposes to harmonize Congress' intent to provide a land base to
1. Wash. Enabling Act, §§ 11-17, 25 Stat. 676 (1889) (found in 0 WASH. REV. CODE at 19-25
(1989)).
2. WASH. STATE DEP'T OF NATURAL REsoucEs, 1984-1993 FOREST LAND MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM xii (1983) [hereinafter FOREST MANAGEMENT PROGRAM].
3. Id.
4. Washington's Federal Land Grant Trusts 6 (internal memorandum provided by John
Hughes, Assistant Attorney General, copy on file with Washington Law Review).
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support public education with the public's interest in protecting eco-
logical resources for future generations.
I. THE WASHINGTON ENABLING ACT AND THE LAW OF
RESTRICTIVE GRANTS
Washington State owns approximately 2.1 million acres of forest
lands which are managed by the Washington State Department of
Natural Resources (DNR).5 Washington acquired most of these lands
at statehood through federal land grants to support public education.6
A. The Constitutional and Statutory Framework Governing
Management of Granted Lands
1. The Washington Enabling Act
Congress granted most of the land in two sections of the Washing-
ton Enabling Act. Section 10 of the Washington Enabling Act
granted almost 2.5 million acres to support common schools.7 Con-
gress left ultimate management and disposition of section 10 land to
the state legislature, while imposing certain limits on its discretion.'
Section 17 of the Washington Enabling Act granted additional blocks
of 100,000 acres each to establish a scientific school, state colleges, and
public buildings at the state capital. In addition, section 17 granted a
block of 200,000 acres for state charitable, educational, penal and
reformatory institutions.' Congress required the use and disposition
of section 17 lands to be "exclusively" for those prescribed purposes.1 0
5. FOREST MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, supra note 2, at iii.
6. See Wash. Enabling Act §§ 10, 17. From the beginning of our nation's history, the federal
government has granted land to new states as they entered the union to support education and
other public purposes. These grants were made out of the idealistic motive of supporting public
education and the pragmatic goal of making Western settlement more attractive. See M.
ORFIELD, FEDERAL LAND GRANTS TO THE STATES WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
MINNESOTA 36-125 (1915); F. SwiFT, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC PERMANENT COMMON SCHOOL
FUNDS IN THE UNITED STATES 48 (1911).
7. Wash. Enabling Act § 10.
8. The Washington Enabling Act § 11 provides: (1) that lands granted for educational
purposes may be disposed of only at public sale with the proceeds of the sale to constitute a
permanent school fund; and (2) that land may only be leased for periods of less than five years
with restrictions on the amount of land any one individual may lease. Congress has amended
section I 1 several times, among other things, liberalizing the restrictions on leasing. See 0 WASH.
REV. CODE at 21-23 (1989).
9. Wash. Enabling Act § 17. These grants were "in lieu of" land grants made by previous
acts of Congress to other states, including grants made for internal improvements, saline land
grants and swamp land grants. Id. Other sections of the Act made much smaller dedications of
federal land for other public purposes. See id. §§ 12, 14, 15.
10. Id. § 17. To ensure that these limits were respected, Congress conditioned Washington's
admission to the Union on the adoption of a state constitution in compliance with the provisions
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2. The State Constitution and Subsequent Enactments
Article XVI of the state constitution provides that "[a]ll the public
lands granted to the state are held in trust for all the people."' 1 Arti-
cle XVI also sets forth restrictions and procedures for the sale and
disposition of granted lands substantially similar to the restrictions
and procedures mandated by the Enabling Act.12
The state legislature has enacted a number of provisions relating
directly to the protection of natural areas on granted lands.13 With-
drawals of state lands for recreational purposes are permitted within
the constraints established by the constitution and the Enabling Act.14
More significantly, state land managers may withdraw lands for the
observation, study, and enjoyment of natural ecological systems, 5
provided that the land trusts are compensated in full for any interests
disposed of. 6 The legislature did not intend these statutes to modify
the purported obligation of state land managers to mafiage the land in
the best interests of the "beneficiaries" of granted lands.7
B. Limits to State Officials' Discretion in Managing Public Lands
Washington courts have applied private trust principles when for-
mulating rules for management of educational land grants.18 Other
legal principles also may be relevant to management and disposition of
state lands. Among these, the most important are (1) the public trust
doctrine and (2) the principles applying to private and public land
dedications.
of the Enabling Act. Id. § 8. Unlike later Enabling Acts, Congress made no provision enforcing
the Act's restrictions after Washington was admitted to the Union and title to the land passed to
the state. See, eg., Ariz. Enabling Act, § 28, 36 Stat. 575 (1910) (stating that non-compliance
with the terms of the Act constitutes a "breach of trust," and empowering the United States
Attorney General to seek judicial remedies).
11. WASH. CONST. art. XVI, § 1.
12. See id. § 1 (lands and assets from the lands may not be disposed of for less than full
market value) and § 2 (requiring sale at public auction).
13. See infra note 55 (application of Forest Practices Act and State Environmental Policy Act
to management of granted lands).
14. WASH. REV. CODE § 79.08.1072 (1989).
15. Id. § 79.68.060.
16. Id. § 79.70.040.
17. Id. § 79.68.060.
18. County of Skamania v. State, 102 Wash. 2d 127, 134, 685 P.2d 576, 580 (1984) (citing G.
BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 543, at 197-98 (2d ed. 1978).
- 153
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1. The Private Trust
A private trust strictly limits the trustee's discretion to modify the
use of land or other trust property. 19 A trust relationship requires the
trustee to act in strict conformity with fiduciary principles in manag-
ing trust assets."z An express trust is created, however, only if there is
a clear manifestation by the grantor (the settlor) and the recipient (the
trustee) to create a trust.2' The standard of proof for intent to create a
trust is exacting, requiring more than a mere preponderance of the
evidence.22
2. The Public Trust
Although state agencies have broad discretion in managing public
lands, the public trust doctrine limits agency discretion.23 In its tradi-
tional form, the public trust doctrine prohibits the state from surren-
dering state control over public resources. 24  A more modem and
expansive conception of the public trust doctrine imposes upon public
19. A trust is "a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, subjecting the person by
whom the title to the property is held to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit
of another." RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959).
20. The trustee's most fundamental fiduciary duty is the duty of loyalty, which requires the
trustee to administer the trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries. In re Estate of Johnson,
187 Wash. 552, 554, 60 P.2d 271, 271-72 (1936). The trustee also has a duty to prudently manage
trust property. In re Park's Trust, 39 Wash. 2d 763, 767-68, 238 P.2d 1205, 1208 (1951); see
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.100.020 (1989).
In certain limited circumstances, the restrictiveness of the relationship can be tempered
somewhat through judicial intervention. Under the doctrine of cy pres, a court may reform the
purposes of a charitable trust, but only where the settlor has manifested a general charitable
intent and accomplishing the settlor's original purpose is impossible, impractical, or illegal. See,
e.g., Puget Sound Nat'l Bank of Tacoma v. Easterday, 56 Wash. 2d 937, 949-50, 350 P.2d 444,
450 (1960) (applying cy pres where testator's will created charitable trust for unwed mothers
discharged from a home and the home was subsequently discontinued). The courts have
traditionally hesitated to apply cy pres to achieve charitable efficiency in situations lacking
impossibility or nonfulfillment of purpose. See Comment, Relaxing the Dead Hand's Grip:
Charitable Efficiency and the Doctrine of Cy Pres, 74 VA. L. REV. 635, 648-49 (1988).
21. Hoffman v. Tieton View Community Methodist Episcopal Church, 33 Wash. 2d 716, 724-
26, 207 P.2d 699, 704-05 (1949) (99-year lease to a church for nominal rental payments for
church, charitable, literary, or community purposes held to be a simple lease not a trust).
22. See, e.g., In re Madsen's Estate, 48 Wash. 2d 675, 678, 296 P.2d 518, 519 (1956) (applying
a beyond reasonable doubt standard); Hoffman, 33 Wash. 2d at 726, 207 P.2d at 705 (applying a
clear and convincing evidence standard).
23. See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 477 (1970); Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public
Land Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 269, 310 (1980).
24. See, e.g., Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966)
(invalidating agency decision granting long-term lease of state park land to ski-resort developer);
Jerke v. Department of State Lands, 182 Mont. 294, 597 P.2d 49 (1979) (requiring payment of
full market value when state lands are leased).
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agencies an affirmative and continuing obligation to consider and pro-
tect public trust values when allocating public trust resources.25 In
modem times, courts almost always find these public values to include
enjoyment and study of intact natural systems.26
The Washington Supreme Court has adopted the public trust doc-
trine as part of Washington's common law governing submerged
lands,27 but has not yet extended it to other public lands.28 However,
the Washington constitution provides that public lands granted to the
state are "held in trust for all the people."' 29 Moreover, the State Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (SEPA), does apply to upland areas.30 SEPA
requires state agencies to adopt policies to "[f]ulfill the responsibilities
of each generation as trustee of the environment for suceeding
generations.""1
3. Dedications of Land for Public Purposes
Dedications fall into two categories: private and public. Dedications
of land for public use usually impose fewer restrictions on use than a
private trust but more restrictions than the public trust.
A private dedication occurs when a landowner declares an intent to
devote land to a public use.32 A public body must accept the terms of
a dedication explicitly, or implicitly by assuming control over the
land. 3 A private dedication of land for a specified public purpose
does not create a trust relationship unless the grantor explicitly
25. See, eg., National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 33 Cal. 3d 419,
658 P.2d 709, 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 364 (state has "affirmative duty to take the public trust
into account... and to protect public trust uses whenever feasible"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977
(1983); see also W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 180-81 (1977) (suggesting a principle of
maximum mitigation or best available technology).
26. See, e.g., Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 639, 747 P.2d 1062, 1072-73 (1987)
("the public trust doctrine resembles a covenant running with the land... for the benefit of the
public and the land's dependent wildlife"), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1996 (1988).
27. Id. at 639, 747 P.2d at 1076.
28. See Note, The Public Trust Doctrine: Accommodating the Public Need Within
Constitutional Bounds, 63 WASH. L. REV. 1087, 1107-08 (1988).
29. WASH. CONST. art. XVI, § 1.
30. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.020(2) (1989); see also Rodgers, The Washington
Environmental Policy Act, 60 WASH. L. REV. 33, 58-63 n.169 (1984) (citing the Department of
Natural Resources'(DNR) "top dollar" timber management policies as an example of a policy
insufficiently attentive to the substantive provisions of SEPA).
31. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.020(2) (1989).
32. City of Spokane v. Catholic Bishop, 33 Wash. 2d 496, 502, 206 P.2d 277, 281-82 (1949).
33. Id. at 503, 206 P.2d at 282 (acceptance may arise by implication from public use for the
purposes for which the property was dedicated).
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imposes the equitable duties of a trustee upon the public agency
accepting the grant.34
In general, the use of land dedicated for a particular public purpose
must conform to the dedicator's intent. 35 However, the terms of a
dedication imposing land use restrictions are construed strictly against
the dedicator and liberally in favor of public use.3 6 To violate the ded-
icator's intent, the land use must be inconsistent or substantially inter-
fere with the purpose of the dedication.37  For example, when a
dedication does not state the land is to be used exclusively for the
dedicated purpose, courts have held that other uses are permissible.3"
Courts apply a rebuttable presumption that the dedicator contem-
plated that the state may adjust the land's dedicated use as circum-
stances change. 39  Applying this rebuttable presumption eases the
burden imposed on the public by restrictive dedications. The pre-
sumption may be rebutted only by a showing that the change in the
use would defeat or frustrate the grantor's basic intent.' Thus, when
the language of the grant or dedication permits, courts must balance
the private interest in forever restricting land to a favored use against
34. See City of Hermosa Beach v. Superior Court, 231 Cal. App. 2d 295, 41 Cal. Rptr, 796,
798-99 (1964) (dedication of land to city as a "public pleasure ground" did not create charitable
trust (citing 1 G. BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES, § 34)).
35. Donald v. City of Vancouver, 43 Wash. App. 880, 886, 719 P.2d 966, 969 (1986).
36. Rainier Ave. Corp. v. City of Seattle, 80 Wash. 2d 362, 367, 494 P.2d 996, 999 (where
dedicator's intent is ambiguous, the language of the deed is construed to favor public's interest in
open space), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 983 (1972). Restrictions on the use of land granted in fee are
not favored in Washington. Jones v. Williams, 56 Wash. 588, 592, 106 P. 166, 168 (1910).
37. See Lander v. Village of South Orange, 58 N.J. 509, 279 A.2d 633, 637 (1971) (permitting
a municipal pool on land dedicated for use as a playground); 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY
§ 1111 (3d ed. 1975). Some courts hold that the use must "patently distort, negate or violate" the
grantor's intent. Angel v. City of Newport, 109 R.I. 558, 288 A.2d 498, 501 (1972) (permitting
leasing of a part of a dedicated park for establishment of an indoor recreational facility for
retarded children); see also Hyland v. City of Eugene, 179 Or. 567, 173 P.2d 464 (1946)
(permitting dedicated park to be used as a temporary trailer park for the families of returning
war veterans).
38. See, e.g., King County v. Hanson Inv. Co., 34 Wash. 2d 112, 118, 208 P.2d 113, 117
(1949) (excess land granted for a road could be used for a public park where deed did not say
"for road purposes only").
39. Angel, 288 A.2d at 501; see Albee v. Town of Yarrow Point, 74 Wash. 2d 453, 457, 460,
445 P.2d 340, 343-44 (1968) (presuming dedicator intended to extend road dedicated to public
use across land submerged at time of dedication to provide access to lake where level of lake
susequently lowered, and permitting land dedicated for public access to lake navigation to be
used for recreation access when passenger ferry discontinued); 23 AM. JUR. 2D Dedication § 68
(1983).
40. Angel, 288 A.2d at 501 (lease of a small part of dedicated park to non-profit group for
indoor recreation facility for retarded children, but open to the public, would not frustrate or
defeat the dedicator's intent).
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society's interest in allocating land, a finite resource, to uses which are
most beneficial to society.
In public dedications, where land is dedicated to a public use by a
public body, the legislature has broad discretion to change the land's
use.41 The rule applies whether the state acquired the land by
purchase, condemnation, or grant from the federal government.42
State agencies have more limited discretion to change the use of dedi-
cated land absent explicit legislative authorization. 3 However, courts
will likely uphold an agency's change in the use of publically dedicated
land without legislative authorization if the land remains under the
control of a public body and the amount of land diverted is minor
compared with the original area.'
The federal government may dedicate land by act of Congress.45
Courts often apply dedication principles in construing the terms of
federal land grants to state or local governments. 46 However, courts
interpret the terms of federal land grants to state and local govern-
ments less strictly than private dedications.47
C. Applying Private Trust Principles to State Administration of
Educational Land Grants-County of Skamania v. State
In County of Skamania v. State,48 the Washington Supreme Court
held that the state holds granted lands in trust for the beneficiaries
named in the Enabling Act. The Skamania court applied trust princi-
ples to strike down a statute authorizing purchasers of timber from
educational grant lands to default on timber sales contracts.49 The
statute allowed the purchasers to renegotiate the contracts with the
41. Seattle Land & Improvement Co. v. City of Seattle, 37 Wash. 274, 277, 79 P. 780, 781
(1905).
42. See Carson v. State, 240 Iowa 1178, 38 N.W.2d 168, 175 (1949).
43. See, e.g., Paepcke v. Public Bldg. Comm'n of Chicago, 46 Ill. 2d 330, 263 N.E.2d 11, 19
(1970).
44. See id.
45. See, eg., United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 154 U.S. 225, 238 (1893).
46. See, e.g., Idaho v. Hodel, 814 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir.) (permitting the leasing of home sites in
land granted to the state to be "held, used and maintained solely as a public park"), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 159 (1987). Notably, the Hodel court rejected the rule enunciated in United States v.
Union Pac. RA., 353 U.S. 112, 116 (1957), and argued for in the dissenting opinion, Hodel, 814
F.2d at 1300, that federal land grants should be interpreted in favor of the federal government,
where, as in this case, the grantee was a public body.
47. See, e.g., Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations v. Board of County Comm'rs of Love County,
361 F.2d 932, 935 (10th Cir. 1966) (permitting extraction of oil and gas from land granted by the
United States to the county "in trust for cemetery purposes only").
48. 102 Wash. 2d 127, 685 P.2d 576 (1984).
49. Id. at 130, 139, 685 P.2d at 578, 583.
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state to reflect a fall in timber prices. The court struck down the stat-
ute because it violated (1) the state's fiduciary duty of undivided loy-
alty to the beneficiaries designated in the Enabling Act,50 and (2) the
state's duty to act prudently when managing trust assets.51 The court
held that this breach of trust violated the constitutional requirement
that the state seek full market value when disposing of trust assets.5 2
Courts in other states have applied private trust principles to invali-
date diversions of state school lands to private parties. 3 Cases involv-
ing proposed changes in use of granted land for a legitimate public
purpose,54 especially for the purpose of protecting the environment,
are relatively rare. Environmental regulations generally have been
held to apply to granted lands even when these laws may potentially
reduce the flow of income to educational institutions. 55  On the other
hand, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the diversion of state uni-
versity lands to the state park system was a breach of the state's trust
duties. 6 Even so, the court refused to invalidate the legislation.
Instead, the court required the state to compensate the university trust
fund either in cash or land of equal value.57
50. Id. at 136, 685 P.2d at 582.
51. Id. at 138-39, 685 P.2d at 582-83.
52. Id. at 139, 685 P.2d at 583 (citing WASH. CONST. art XVI, § 1). The court also relied on
Lassen v. Arizona ex rel. Ariz. Highway Dep't, 385 U.S. 458, 469 (1967) (requiring full
compensation to school trust fund for transfer of highway easements across educational grant
lands to state highway department). Skamania, 102 Wash. 2d at 132, 685 P.2d at 580.
53. See, e.g., State v. Board of Educ. Lands and Funds, 154 Neb. 244, 47 N.W.2d 520 (1951);
Oklahoma Educ. Ass'n v. Nigh, 642 P.2d 230 (Okla. 1982) (invalidating preference leasing
systems which did not require payment of full market rental value); but see Frolander v. Ilsley,
72 Wyo. 342, 264 P.2d 790 (1953) (upholding statutory leasing scheme giving lease renewal
preference to state residents).
54. See, e.g, Kanaly v. South Dakota, 368 N.W.2d 819, 824 (S.D. 1985) (transfer of state
university lands granted under the same terms as Washington Enabling Act § 17, to the state
prison system without compensation to the university trust fund violated the South Dakota
Enabling Act and constitution).
55. For example, Forest Practices Act requirements apply to timber sales on granted land.
West Norman Timber v. State, 37 Wash. 2d 467, 224 P.2d 635 (1950) (rejecting a timber
company's challenge to an administrative order, made pursuant to the Forest Practices Act, that
the company leave 27 acres of timber standing as seed areas). Likewise, SEPA, WASH REV.
CODE § 43.21C.020 (1989), requires the DNR to prepare an environmental impact statement for
any timber sale which may significantly affect environmental quality. Noel v. Cole, 98 Wash. 2d
375, 380 n.2, 655 P.2d 245, 249 n.2 (1982) (DNR cannot conclusively presume that timber sales
on granted lands will have no significant environmental impact and thus avoid SEPA
requirements).
56. State v. University of Alaska, 624 P.2d 807, 813 (Alaska 1981). Congress granted the
university lands to Alaska for the "exclusive use and benefit" of the university. Act of 1929 § 1,
45 Stat. 1091 (1929).
57. University of Alaska, 624 P.2d at 816.
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II. HARMONIZING THE ENABLING ACT AND THE
CONSTITUTION-USING DEDICATION
PRINCIPLES TO PRESERVE BIOTIC
DIVERSITY
Western Washington's old-growth douglas fir forests are unique. 8
The old growth forest ecosystem is vitally important to the state's
fish59 and wildlife." Since the time of the Washington Enabling Act,
intensive logging has severely depleted the old-growth forests on state
and federal lands and threatens their dependent ecosystems. 61 These
impacts can only be mitigated if the state takes steps soon to preserve
the state's remaining old-growth forests and to retain or re-create the
ecological attributes of old-growth forests on cut-over lands.
The private trust theory adopted in Skamania can only hamper
efforts to protect ecological values on state forest lands. State land
58. The old-growth Douglas fir forests of the Pacific Northwest are the "only remaining
expanse of virgin forest in the conterminous United States." L. HARRIS, THE FRAGMENTED
FOREST 5 (1984) Most of the distinctive features of old-growth forests can be related to three
structural features: (1) old trees, usually between 350 to 750 years old, (2) large snags, and (3)
large fallen logs on the forest floor and in forest streams. J. FRANKLIN, K. CROMACK, W.
DENISON, A. MCKEE, C. MASER, J. SEDELL, F. SWANSON, G. JUDAY, ECOLOGICAL
CHARACTERISTICS OF OLD-GROWTH DOUGLAS-FIR FORESTS 1, 20 (U.S. Dep't of Agriculture,
Forest Service, General Technical Report PNW-118, 1981) [hereinafter ECOLOGICAL
CHARACTERISTICS].
59. Large downed logs in streams stabilize stream banks and prevent erosion by dissipating
the kinetic energy of falling water. ECOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 58 at 37-40.
Sedimentation of streams can be devastating to fish habitat.
60. Old-growth and mature forests provide primary habitat for 118 species of vertebrates,
over one-third of which (40 species) cannot survive outside this forest type. See.L. HARRIS,
supra note 58, at 68.
61. At the turn of the century, about 85% of the forest land in Western Washington was old-
growth forest, with the rest second-growth. L. HARRIS, supra note 58, at 29-30. Today the
proportions are approximately reversed. As little as 10% of forest land remains in mature or
old-growth forest. 'Id at 34. Over the past 30 years, the annual loss and removal of Douglas-fir
from Western Washington and Oregon has averaged three times annual growth. Id. at 27. Only
28,000 acres of forest more than 200 years old and about 120,000 acres of forest older than 100
years old remain on state lands. Telephone interview with Jerry Kamminga of DNR (Jan. 17,
1989).
Logging in Western Washington has had a severe impact on natural ecosystems. For example,
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service proposes listing the northern spotted owl, a species indicating
the health of the old-growth ecosystem, as threatened under the Endangered Species Act (ESA),
16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-43 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987). 54 Fed. Reg. 26666 (June 23, 1989).
The ESA prohibits the taking of threatened species. § 1538(l)(b). Taking includes destruction
of critical habitat. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184-85 n.30 (1978).
Further, the ESA preempts less protective state regulation. § 1535(f). However, exemptions
from the ESA are available to states and private parties who formulate an approved Habitat
Conservation Plan or apply to the cabinet-level Endangered Species Committee for a special
exemption. §§ 1536(e-o), 1539(a). The complexities of the ESA are beyond the scope of this
Comment.
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managers and the courts should consider other theories, particularly
the principles applying to land dedications, in order to harmonize the
Enabling Act and the constitution and to avoid an unfortunate conflict
between two laudable goals: providing funds for education and pro-
tecting the environment.
A. Skamania's Use of Private Trust Theory Was Inappropriate
The Skamania court's application of private trust principles to the
management of granted lands was inappropriate. First, neither Con-
gress nor the framers of the constitution manifest an intent to create a
land trust on behalf of a class of beneficiaries smaller than the public at
large. Second, strict application of private trust principles to manage-
ment of granted lands clashes with public trust interests in the land
and its dependent wildlife as protected by the constitution and SEPA.
Ironically, the court could have reached the same result, without
resorting to trust law, based on the plain language of the constitution's
public trust provisions.
1. Intent to Impose Equitable Duties
The Enabling Act does not manifest an intent to impose the equita-
ble duties of a trustee on the state.62 Section 10 of the Enabling Act
provides that the 2.5 million acres of lands granted the state under
that section is for the support of common schools.6" But the Enabling
Act does not impose affirmative duties upon the state regarding how it
is to manage the Section 10 land. 6' Although the proceeds of a sale of
Section 10 lands must be deposited in "a permanent school fund," the
Enabling Act does not require that the land or its resources be sold at
a particular rate or that they be sold at all.65 Thus, although Congress
may have imposed a minimal duty of care upon the state when dispos-
ing of granted lands,66 it did not impose a duty of loyalty requiring the
state to manage granted lands solely in the economic interests of "trust
beneficiaries. "67
62. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing elements of a trust).
63. Wash. Enabling Act § 10.
64. The Enabling Act does impose duties upon the state regarding the disposition of the land.
See id. § 11 (requiring a public sale at a price not less than ten dollars an acre). The provisions of
the Enabling Act relating to disposition of section 10 land do not affect the management of land
prior to its disposition. See McCormack, Land Use Planning and Management of State School
Lands, 3 UTAH L. REV. 525 (1982).
65. Wash. Enabling Act § 11; see 25 Op. Att'y Gen. 9 (1984).
66. See supra note 8 (discussing requirements of Wash. Enabling Act § 11).
67. Cf County of Skamania v. State, 102 Wash. 2d 127, 135-36, 685 P.2d 576, 581 (1984).
Congress' lack of intent to create a trust is even more apparent when the Washington Enabling
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2. Intent to Assume the Duties of a Trustee
The state constitution does not manifest an intent to assume a
trustee's duty to manage granted land solely in the interests of "trust
beneficiaries."68 While the constitution provides that the state holds
lands granted by Congress in trust, the trust is on behalf of "all the
people" of the state, not a smaller class of favored beneficiaries.69 The
constitution's terms are more reminiscent of the public trust than of
a strict private trust.7 ° Thus, the constitution does not clearly and
convincingly manifest an intent to manage assets solely in the interests
of specific beneficiaries-a prerequsite to creating a trust.71 The
Skamania court's application of private trust principles, including the
duty of loyalty, is therefore out of step with the intent of the framers of
the state constitution.
3. Applying Private Trust Principles Clashes with the Public Trust
Established in the Constitution
The guiding principle of Article XVI of the constitution is that
granted lands in Washington are held "in trust" for all the people of
the state.72  The constitution provides partial guidance concerning
how the state is to honor this trust, imposing a basic duty not to give
away public lands.73  The constitution reflects the nineteenth century
conception of the public trust, which served to protect the public from
Act is read in light of later acts granting land to states or territories. See, e.g., Ariz. Enabling
Act, § 28, 36 Stat. 574 (1910) (imposing affirmative duties with respect to land management;
providing that failure to comply with these duties is a "breach of trust"; and setting out a remedy
for "breach of trust" characteristic of traditional charitable trust remedies-a suit brought by the
U.S. Attorney General); see also 45 CONG. REc. 8227 (1910) (remarks of Senator Beveridge,
Chairman of Senate Committee on the Territories) (trust language of Section 28 was intended to
prevent the abuses of state discretion which had occured in previous land grants). Absence of
similar language in the Washington Enabling Act is evidence of Congress' lack of intent to create
a trust in the Washington Act.
68. See supra notes 21, 67 and accompanying text (discussing elements of a trust).
69. WASH. CONST. art. XVI, § 1. In fact, proposals requiring the state to maximize the flow
of revenues to the schools were twice considered but never adopted by the Constitutional
Convention. See JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1889,
793-94 (1962).
70. See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text (explaining public trust doctrine).
71. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (discussing elements of a trust and standard
of proof).
72. WASH. CONST. art. XVI, § 1.
73. See id. § 3 (requiring no more than one-fourth of the land granted for educational
purposes be sold before 1895, and no more than one half before 1905), § 1 (providing that land or
any interest therein shall not be disposed of for less that full market value), and § 2 (requiring
sale at public auction).
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the reckless and sometimes fraudulent disposition of valuable public
lands to private interests.74
The constitution provides little guidance to the state concerning
management of granted land prior to its disposition. To give the pub-
lic trust meaning in an era of land management rather than disposi-
tion, courts should read the constitution in light of modem public
trust conceptions, which protect public values in the context of
resource management.75 The modem public trust requires that state
agencies, at the very least, consider public trust values, such as fish
and wildlife, when managing or allocating public trust resources.
SEPA reflects the modern public trust doctrine, by requiring state
agencies to act as environmental trustees for future generations of
Washingtonians.76
In the context of state forest lands, applying private trust principles
announced in Skamania will lead to an irreconcilable conflict between
private trust principles and contemporary conceptions of the public
trust.77 For example, the state has designed timber management plans
under Skamania trust principles to maximize commodity production
in order to generate more revenues for educational beneficiaries.78
These objectives clash with the broader public trust, which protects
the public's interest in the land and its dependent wildlife,79 and man-
dates that commodity production be tempered where it has an impact
on ecological values. Strict adherence to Skamania private trust prin-
ciples makes harmonization of these legitimate and important govem-
mental objectives an unnecessarily difficult task.8
74. See, e.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (striking down the Illinois
legislature's disposition of the Chicago harbor to a private railroad company).
75. See Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 641, 747 P.2d 1062, 1073 (the scope of the
public trust is based on "a recognition of where the public need" lies), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
1996 (1988); see also supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (discussing the application of the
public trust to natural resource management).
76. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.020 (1989); see also supra note 30 and accompanying text
(discussing the public trust embedded in SEPA).
77. Under the private trust principles set forth in Skamania, the duty of loyalty requires the
state as trustee to manage trust lands and assets solely in the interests of a designated class of
beneficiaries. County of Skamania v. State, 102 Wash. 2d 127, 134, 685 P.2d 576, 580 (1984).
The public trust, on the other hand, requires that land managers consider the broader public
interest when planning management strategies. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
78. FOREST LAND MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, supra note 2, at xiii.
79. Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 640, 747 P.2d 1062, 1073, cert denied, 108 S. Ct.
1996 (1988).
80. The doctrine of cy pres is of only limited utility in resolving the conflict. See supra note 20
(discussing the principle of cy pres). First, it would be difficult to demonstrate that the Enabling
Act manifests a general charitable intent broad enough to encompass the protection of biological
resources. Second, it would be difficult to argue that compliance with the terms of the "trust"
would be impossible or even impractical. Finally, the application of cy pres would place critical
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4. The Skamania Court's Discourse on the Law of Trusts Was
Unnecessary
Ironically, the Skamania court's holding that the legislature
breached its "fiduciary duty" means nothing more than that the legis-
lature violated the constitutional proscription against giving away
public trust assets when it allowed timber contract relief.81 Indeed,
the court acknowleged that in this case the duty of undivided loyalty
means that when the state transfers trust assets it must seek the assets'
full value.8 2 The state violated its duty to act prudently by failing "to
satisfy the consitutional requirement that it seek full market value"
when disposing of its interest in granted land.83 Arguably then, the
Skamania court's discussion of private trust principles is dicta while
the holding of the case vindicates the public trust.84
B. Principles Applying to Dedications Are More Appropriate Than
Skamania Principles
Principles applying to land dedications are more appropriate than
the private trust principles set forth in Skamania in governing man-
agement of granted lands." First, dedication principles better reflect
the intent of the framers of the Enabling Act and the constitution.
Second, dedication principles permit public land managers sufficient
flexibility to balance Congressional intent with the public trust.
management decisions in the hands of a court unlikely to have any special expertise in forest
management.
81. Skamania, 102 Wash. 2d at 139, 685 P.2d at 583.
82. Id. at 134, 685 P.2d at 580.
83. Id. at 138, 685 P.2d at 583.
84. Skamania's reliance on the constitution as the source for the state's alleged fiduciary duty
is especially ironic given that the constitutional provision relied on, art. XVI, § 1, provides that
granted lands are "held in trust for all the people."
Besides looking to the constitution as a source of private trust principles, the Skamania court
relied on the United States Supreme Court's holding in Lassen v. Arizona ex reL Ariz. Highway
Dep't, 385 U.S. 458 (1967). Such reliance was misplaced given the differences between the
Arizona Enabling Act and the Washington Act. See supra note 67 (comparing the Washington
and Arizona Enabling Acts).
The other cases relied on by the Skamania court, State ex reL Ebke v. Board of Educ. Lands
and Funds, 154 Neb. 244, 47 N.W.2d 520 (1951) and Oklahoma Educ. Ass'n v. Nigh, 642 P.2d
230 (Okla. 1982) (invaliding the granting of preference lease renewals) involved legislation which
unconstitutionally gave away public assets to private parties for less than full value. These cases
are as equally consistent with public trust doctrine as with private trust principles.
85. The use of dedication principles to construe federal land grants to states is not
unprecedented. See supra note 46 (discussing Idaho v. Hodel, 814 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 159 (1987)).
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1. Dedication Principles are More Consistant with the Intent of the
Framers
Although the Enabling Act and the constitution do not clearly and
convincingly manifest an intent to create a trust, they are sufficient to
effect a valid dedication of land for a particular public purpose. A
dedication, unlike an express trust, does not require a reciprocal mani-
festation of intent.8 6 The Enabling Act clearly expresses an intent to
grant land to the state for specific public purposes.8 7 The Act transfers
title to federal lands to the state,88 and specifies the purposes for which
the state should use the land.89 Although the constitution does not
manifest a clear intent to accept all the terms of the Enabling Act,9°
under dedication principles, this defect is not fatal. On the contrary,
the dedication is effective because the state assumed control of the
land.9' The dedication concept, therefore, is more consistent with the
terms of the Enabling Act and the constitution, than the private trust
theory postulated in Skamania.
2. Dedication Principles Allow Harmonization of the Enabling Act
and Constitution
Like trust principles, dedication principles require the state to
adhere to Congress' intent that granted lands be used to support edu-
cational and other public institutions.92 Unlike trust principles, dedi-
cation law allows the state discretion to fulfill its constitutional public
trust obligations. Two aspects of dedication law permit flexibility:
First, the rule of construction that ambiguous terms of a dedication
should be read against the dedicator and in favor of free public use;
and second, the rebuttable presumption that the grantor intended the
use of the land to change as circumstances change.93
a. A Rule of Construction Favoring Free Public Use
Under dedication principles, ambiguous terms of a dedication must
be read against the dedicator. Section 10 of the Washington Enabling
86. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text (describing elements of a dedication).
87. Wash. Enabling Act §§ 10, 17.
88. See Thompson v. Savidge, 110 Wash. 486, 506, 118 P. 397, 403 (1920) (title technically
did not pass until the lands were surveyed).
89. Wash. Enabling Act §§ 10, 17.
90. For example, the constitution does not state that lands granted under § 17 of the
Washington Enabling Act are to be held "exclusively" for the purposes designated in the Act.
91. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing elements of a dedication).
92. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (discribing rules of construction for
dedications).
93. See supra notes 36, 39-40 and accompanying text.
Vol. 65:151, 1990
Old-Growth Forests
Act, when construed in light of section 17, is ambiguous regarding
state discretion in land management.
Section 10 and section 17 of the Enabling Act are strikingly dissimi-
lar. First, section 17 limits the purposes for which the land can be
held and appropriated and regulates the means of its disposal. By con-
trast, section 10 contains no limitations on how land may be held or
appropriated. Second, section 17 expressly restricts the lands' permis-
sible uses to those "exclusively" designated in the Act. But section 10,
although stating that the lands were granted to the state for school
support, does not state that the lands were granted only for that pur-
pose. Lands granted under section 10 are subject only to the Act's
general restrictions on disposal.9" Congress restricted the use of
granted land to an exclusive purpose in section 17. It chose not to do
so in section 10. If Congress intended to restrict the use of section 10
land to school support purposes only, such an intent is not apparent
on the face of the Act. Under dedication principles, ambiguous
grants, like section 10, are read against the dedicator and in favor of
free public use.9" This rule of construction allows state land managers
the flexibility to consider the constitutional public trust when manag-
ing section 10 lands.96 Thus, unlike the Skamania principles, the rule
of construction applicable to dedications allows harmonization of the
Enabling Act and the constitution.
b. A Rebuttable Presumption Allowing Changes in Use
The Enabling Act and the constitution also may be harmonized by
way of the rebuttable presumption that Congress, as grantor, intended
the use of the land to change as circumstances change.97 This pre-
sumption would allow the state to protect public trust values, such as
fish and wildlife, on granted lands as they become more scarce and
valuable to the state as a whole. The presumption would be rebutted
only by a showing that a state program to protect these values would
frustrate or defeat Congress' intent.98 Unlike Skamania principles,
94. See supra note 8 (discussing Wash. Enabling Act § 11).
95. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (rules of construction for dedications).
96. Under dedication principles, the state's interest in protecting these values could be
pursued on section 10 lands as long as the state does not substantially interfere with Congress's
intent that the lands be used primarily to support education. See supra note 37 and
accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (presumptions applying to dedications).
98. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. A useful guide for land managers and courts to
use in evaluating whether affirmative steps to protect public trust values on land granted under
section 10 would frustrate or defeat congressional intent may be borrowed from the test set forth
in Paepcke v. Public Bldg. Comm'n of Chicago, 46 ill. 2d 330, 263 N.E.2d 11, 19 (1970). Under
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which favor rigid adherence to past preferences, this presumption
allows the flexibility needed to vindicate public rights within the con-
text of the restrictions imposed by the Enabling Act.
C. Protecting Biotic Diversity Using Dedication Principles
Some foresters have proposed innovative strategies to preserve the
rich biotic diversity characteristic of old-growth douglas fir forests,
even where such forests largely are devoted to commodity production.
Under dedication principles, the DNR could implement these strate-
gies on state-owned lands within the constraints established in the
Enabling Act and the state constitution.
1. Preserving Biotic Diversity in a Fragmented Forest
In The Fragmented Forest, Professor Harris develops a strategy for
preserving biotic diversity in managed Pacific Northwest forests. 99 He
bases his strategy on the principles of island biogeography." ° Island
biogeography suggests that preservation and restoration of "long-rota-
tion islands" can be effective in preserving biotic diversity if the islands
are strategically located.1"' Long-rotation islands, existing within a
sea of intensively managed forest, could be effective in preserving wild-
life habitat if the islands are linked by travel corridors preserved along
watercourses and highways.'o
A complimentary strategy for promoting biotic diversity on forest
tracts managed primarily for commodity production is to retain
selected old-growth attributes, such as snags or downed logs, on land
the Paepcke test, a diversion of granted land does not frustrate Congressional intent if it is small
in relation to the total area of the grant and if the benefits to the public in protecting public trust
values are outweighed by the detriment caused by the loss of the land for school support
purposes. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
99. L. HARRIS, supra note 58, at 127-144.
100. See id. at 71-92.
101. Id. at 90-92. Professor Harris cautions against permanent set-asides of old-growth
islands because these islands will inevitably fall victim to fire or disease. Rather, he suggests a
system of "long-rotation islands," where a core of old-growth is surrounded by a buffer core of
forest managed on a 320-year rotation. Once the long-rotation buffer is well established, the old-
growth core could be harvested. Id. at 128-30.
102. For example, a biogeographic strategy might work in the important Hoh-Clearwater
area adjacent to Olympic National Park. This area has most of the remaining old-growth and
mature forest on state lands, although it is fragmented by prior logging. The area is currently the
focus of an intensive review by the Commission on Old-Growth Alternatives for Washington's
Forest Trust Lands, an advisory panel appointed by the Governor. See Seattle Post-
Intelligencer, May 10, 1989, at A17, col. 1.
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that is logged."3 Management for selected old-growth attributes
might preserve valuable wildlife habitat even on land devoted to inten-
sive timber management. t° Strategic preservation of long-rotation
islands, implemented in combination with a strategy to preserve
selected old-growth attributes on tracts devoted to commodity produc-
tion would go far in protecting public trust values on state lands.
2. The Legal Framework for Preserving Biotic Diversity
Dedication principles would allow the state to implement the strat-
egy sketched above consistent with the Enabling Act and the constitu-
tion. First, DNR could establish a system of long-rotation islands on
section 10 school lands. Second, on section 10 lands not devoted to
long-rotation management and on section 17 lands, the state could
regulate commodity production to require the cost-effective retention
of selected old-growth attributes.
Under the rule of construction applying to dedications,105 the state
would have substantial discretion to pursue alternative management
objectives on Section 10 school lands so long as they do not substan-
tially interfere with Congress's overriding intent that these lands be
used to support public education. Under dedication principles, long
rotation islands could be established on Section 10 lands so long as (1)
they Would not involve the permanent disposition of any land,'0 6 (2)
the amount of land devoted to protecting biotic diversity would
remain small compared to the total land area,'0 7 and (3) the benefit to
the public in preserving public trust values would outweigh the cost to
103. See ECOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 58, at 43. Although this is not the best
strategy for preserving biotic diversity, it has the advanatge of optimizing biotic diversity while
managing a forest for maximum economic return. Id.
104. J. Calhoun (Olympic Area Manager, Department of Natural Resources), Hoh-
Clearwater: A Forest Managed for Commodities and Ecological Functions, Report from Work
Group on Forest Research Program/Facility to Members of the Commission on Old Growth
Alternatives for Washington's Forest Trust Lands, March 10, 1989 (copy on file with
Washington Law Review) [hereinafter Hoh-Clearwater]. This form of management does not
affect the overall harvest level. However, increased costs produce about a 10% loss in timber sale
revenues. J. Calhoun, Oral Presentation to Commission on Old-Growth Alternatives, March 10,
1989 (notes on file with Washington Law Review).
105. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text (rules of construction for dedications).
106. The state need not compensate the permanent school fund so long as the reservation of
land does not result in the permanent disposition of granted land. Cf. WAsH. REV. CODE
§ 79.70.040 (1989).
107. The total grant under section 10 was 2.5 million acres. See supra note 7 and
accompanying text. Approximately 120,000 acres of old-growth or mature forest remain on state
lands. See supra note 61.
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the state educational system. 108 While remaining within the Enabling
Act's constraints, such balancing also would address constitutional
and statutory public trust concerns.
Public trust values can be optimized even on lands granted under
section 17 of the Enabling Act exclusively to benefit certain public
institutions. 1o9 State regulation to prevent unnecessary harm to public
trust values would not frustrate even the terms of this restrictive grant.
New regulations promulgated under existing state law"' prohibiting
logging practices from causing unnecessary harm to public trust values
should be presumptively valid if they do not significantly reduce the
flow of revenues derived from trust lands."' These regulations could
be tailored toward retaining old-growth attributes on land devoted to
commodity production, such as section 17 land, or to the protection of
travel corridors for wildlife.
The adoption of these two strategies-long-rotation islands and
managing for old-growth attibutes on land which is logged-would
effectively accommodate the respective demands of the constitution
and the Enabling Act. Most important, such strategies would ensure
the perpetuation of biotic diversity on state lands for future
generations.
III. CONCLUSION
The Washington Supreme Court's application of private trust prin-
ciples in County of Skamania v. State was unnecessary and unwise.
The Washington Enabling Act and the state constitution do not create
a trust because the requisite manifestations of intent are lacking.
108. State v. University of Alaska, 624 P.2d 807 (Alaska 1981) is not to the contrary. First,
University of Alaska involved land granted to Alaska for the "exclusive use and benefit" of the
university. 624 P.2d at 812-13. Second, the challenged diversion placed a large amount of the
land into a state park where commodity production to generate revenues would be permanently
barred. Id. at 813. The diversion struck down in University of Alaska, thus clearly frustrated
Congress' intent and would have been invalid even if the court had applied dedication principles.
Likewise in Kanaly v. South Dakota, 368 N.W.2d 819 (S.D. 1985), where land granted to
South Dakota "exclusively" for a state university was diverted for use as a minimum security
prison, the diversion was facially inconsistent with, or even repugnant to, the intent of Congress
as grantor.
109. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing Wash. Enabling Act § 11).
110. The Forest Practices Act, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 76.09.010-935 (1989) and SEPA,
§§ 43.21C.010-914 which already apply to granted lands, reflect earlier efforts to prevent such
harm through environmental regulation. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
111. Regulations could require maintanence of riparian corridors, leaving certain numbers of
standing trees or snags, leaving cull logs and other logging debris, and using logging techniques
which minimize impacts on soil, residual trees and other plants. See J. Calhoun, Hoh-
Clearwater, supra note 104.
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Moreover, private trust theory does not provide sufficient flexibility to
allow actualization of the public trust established in the constitution.
The rules of law applicable to dedications of land to public use are
more appropriate for management of granted lands. The terms of the
Enabling Act and the constitution suffice to effect a valid dedication of
land for public purposes. More important, dedication principles allow
the intent of Congress expressed in the Enabling Act and the the pub-
lic trust established in the state constitution to be harmonized. The
law of dedications provides the flexibility needed to implement innova-
tive strategies to protect biological diversity in a working forest.
John B. Arum
